← Saurabh Bipin Chandra

Twelve seasons, seven managers: Manchester United in expected goals

The chances United created and conceded since 2014, against goals, points, managers and the rest of the Big Six.

What are xG and xGA?

Expected goals (xG) measure how good a team's chances were: roughly how many goals an average side would score from the same shots. xGA is the same for the chances a team allows. Results swing on a deflection or a save; chances are steadier, so they show how good a team really was.

United's best spell was Solskjær's, from 2019 to 2021.

For almost two years United created far more than they conceded, about 0.6 expected goals a match, and finished third and then second. Mourinho's first season hit the single highest point, in March 2017, but it didn't last.

Both of United's second-place finishes were flattered.

In 2017-18 (switch to "Conceding"), United let in 16 fewer goals than the chances against them were worth: David de Gea's best season. In 2020-21 (switch to "Finishing"), they scored more than their chances were worth all year. On chances, neither side was second-best.

United sacked managers once chances fell to +0.10 a match or lower, until ten Hag.

Switch to "By manager". Louis van Gaal, José Mourinho and Ole Gunnar Solskjær were each sacked at their lowest point, with United creating barely more than they conceded (between +0.10 and −0.04 a match). Erik ten Hag dropped below that in August 2023, sank to −0.35 by May 2024, and kept his job until October. Rúben Amorim was sacked at +0.46, his highest point.

Only once did United concede more chances than they created: from ten Hag's second season into Amorim's first.

The one red stretch on the chart, from autumn 2023 to spring 2025. At its worst United were allowing almost two expected goals a match, the most in twelve seasons.

Every new manager except Amorim lifted the team straight away.

Compare each manager's first 10 matches with his predecessor's last 10: the chances jumped under Mourinho, Solskjær, Ralf Rangnick, ten Hag and Michael Carrick, most of all under Solskjær (from +0.10 to +1.01 a match). The points followed, except under Mourinho. Amorim's first 10 barely moved.

Carrick inherited a rising team.

With "By manager" on, Amorim's line climbs all the way through his tenure, and Carrick's carries on from a little higher. The revival was already under way.

United's games have opened up.

Both solid lines have risen since 2016: United now create about 1.9 expected goals a match, up from 1.3, and allow about 1.4, up from 1.0. The whole league has gone the same way.

The long view

The table has flattered United for a decade.

Over twelve seasons United earned about 65 more points than their chances deserved, more than any other Big Six club. On chances alone they'd have averaged about 6.5th, not 5.2. The extreme case: ten Hag's 2023-24 side finished 8th with the chances of a 15th-placed team.

On chances, ten Hag and Amorim were United's worst managers. Ten Hag was luckier; Amorim was improving.

Their teams created almost identical chances, worth 1.46 and 1.45 points a match, the lowest of any United manager. Ten Hag's earned 1.70 points a match, about 20 points more over his tenure than the chances deserved, mostly because opponents kept missing. Amorim's earned 1.23. But Amorim's team got better all the way through his tenure; ten Hag's got worse. The charts below show it from three angles.

Clubs keep managers whose teams keep improving. United sacked the only one who did.

Once the first half-season had passed, Jürgen Klopp's Liverpool and Mikel Arteta's Arsenal kept getting better; both men were kept, and both won the league. Every United manager with a full season got worse from that point, except Amorim, whose team kept improving. He was sacked. Pep Guardiola is a different case: City started at the top and stayed there long enough to win six titles.

Chances decide United's seasons; finishing and conceding decide the margins.

United's points follow their chances far more closely than their finishing or their goalkeeping. Good finishing helped both second places, but the 2022-23 team came third with the worst finishing of the period, because it created plenty.

Points, and the points the chances deserved

Expected points are what a team's chances would earn on average (from Understat). Green where United earned more than that, red where they earned less.
Amorim's results were harsher than his team's chances; ten Hag's and Carrick's were kinder.

With "By manager" on, ten Hag's line is green almost throughout, Amorim's red throughout (8 points short in 2024-25 alone), and Carrick's green again (8.5 points ahead). The luck side of the ten Hag and Amorim story.

Every Big Six manager since 2014

One circle per manager with at least 19 league matches; bigger circles mean longer tenures. Above the line, a manager won more points than his team's chances deserved. The number after each name is his average league finish.
Most managers at the other big clubs did better than every United manager.

Eleven of the 17 managers at Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester City created better chances than any United manager, including five of Chelsea's nine, at the club that changes managers most. When so many managers do better elsewhere, the problem may not be the manager.

Solskjær was United's best manager on chances.

His teams created chances worth 1.74 points a match over 109 games, the best of any United manager with a full season. Mourinho won more points per game, but sits further above the line: more of his points came from beating the chances.

Ten Hag and Amorim sit side by side at the bottom; only luck separates them.

Level on chances, near the bottom of all 29 managers, with ten Hag far above the line and Amorim far below it. The same story as above.

Click a column to sort. Bold marks the best among managers with a full season in charge (lowest average finish, highest for the rest). Finishing is goals scored against expected goals, compared with the league average that season. Conceded vs expected is positive when fewer went in than the chances against were worth. Average finish weights each season by the matches the manager was in charge for.

The Big Six: chances created minus conceded

Expected goals minus expected goals against, per match. Under each season: the champions, whose line is thicker that season. The number on each club's button is its average league finish since 2014-15. Manager names show when two or fewer clubs are selected.
United were behind City in every single week of twelve years.

United's best moment (+0.70 a match, March 2017) barely tops City's worst (+0.60, February 2025). United were also behind Liverpool about 90% of the time and Chelsea 85%.

Arteta's Arsenal improved four years running, then stayed near the top.

From level in his first season, 2019-20, to +1.2 a match in 2024, and around +1 since, with the title in 2025-26.

Guardiola's City peaked in 2017-18, and everyone has been catching up since.

Through 2020 City created about half a goal a match more, net, than the next-best club. The gap narrowed from 2021, and since 2024 someone else has usually been ahead.

Klopp handed Arne Slot a team at its peak.

Add Liverpool: +1.25 in Klopp's last season, +1.34 and the title in Slot's first, then +0.35 a year later, the biggest one-season fall of any Big Six club.

Klopp's Liverpool rose and fell in two-year waves.

Up to +1.32 in 2018-19, down to +0.66, up to +1.59, down to +0.66, up again to +1.25. Their 2019-20 title came in a down year, 25 points above what the chances deserved.

The Big Six: finishing

Goals scored minus expected goals per match, compared with the league average that season. Above zero, a club scored more than its chances were worth.
United's worst finishing came in 2022-23, as low as any Big Six club has been.

In spring 2023 United were scoring 0.38 goals a match fewer than their chances were worth, against the league average; only Chelsea, at the same time, sank as low. United's finishing has been above average only in patches: 2014-15, 2017-18, 2020-21 and briefly in 2025-26.

Notes on the data